In 1994, Shor showed that quantum computers will be able to break cryptosystems based on the problems of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, for example, RSA or ECC. Code-based cryptosystems are promising alternatives to public-key schemes built on these problems, and they are believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. In this paper, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to provide security at least until a given year and give detailed recommendations. Our analysis is based on the lower bound complexity estimates by Sendrier and Finiasz, and the security requirements model proposed by Lenstra and Verheul. This security model uses assumptions about Moore's Law and other developments in order to estimate the attained security level for a given year.
Introduction
Public-key cryptosystems are fundamental components of IT-security solutions, and when they are used, then adequate key sizes must be selected. For RSA, EC-ElGamal, and other factoring and discrete logarithm-based systems that are used today, Lenstra and Verheul [1] proposed a model for how to select appropriate keys that provide security until at least a given year.
We know from [2] that quantum computers can break all these "classical" systems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. This is why post-quantum public-key cryptosystems, which can be implemented today with conventional computers, but, which will remain secure even in the presence of the quantum attacks, must be found, and the problem of selecting cryptographic keys for such systems must be solved.
Cryptosystems based on error-correcting codes are among the best-known and most studied schemes for post-quantum cryptography. Together with cryptographic schemes based on lattices, multivariate polynomials, or on hash functions, they are among the most interesting post-quantum candidates. Moreover, if we talk about post-quantum encryption, only lattice-and code-based cryptography provide adequate solutions at the moment. Error-correcting codes have been applied in cryptography for at least three decades since McEliece published his paper in 1978 [3] . McEliece used the class of binary Goppa codes for his construction. This scheme has resisted attacks to date (apart from minor changes in the parameters) and is very likely to be immune to quantum attacks. Indeed, interesting results regarding the security of McEliece cryptosystem against quantum attacks have been published. These results clarify the question of whether the quantum algorithms proposed by Shor [2] and Grover [4] are able to offer any significant advantage to damage the security of this system. In 2009, Overbeck and Sendrier [5] put forward the argument that it is possible to utilize Grover's algorithm for speeding up the search for secret keys or possible plaintexts, but this will have only a small impact in reducing the cost of decoding algorithms. One year later, Bernstein [6] presented an improvement of an information set decoding attack for quantum computing. However, protecting against this attack requires key sizes to be increased only by a factor of four. Recently, in Dinh et al. [7] showed that the McEliece system is immune to quantum algorithms based on the ideas of Shor's algorithm. More precisely, the McEliece cryptosystem resists any attack using quantum Fourier analysis. This result strengthens considerably the candidacy of code-based systems in the post-quantum world.
In addition to post-quantum security, the McEliece cryptosystem has several advantages. Since it uses only basic arithmetic operations, no special hardware is required for an implementation. The scheme is also very efficient. In fact, in 2009, Eisenbarth [8, p . 78] compared 80-bit security FPGA implementations of different cryptosystems using similar platforms. McEliece beats RSA by a factor of 5 (decryption) to 50 (encryption) and even an elliptic curve scheme by a factor of 5 (encryption). Only the lattice-based scheme NTRU was faster than the McEliece for encryption and decryption, but this scheme is not widely used by the community for patent reasons.
The main drawback of the McEliece scheme is the size of the public and private keys that consist of large binary matrices. Depending on the parameters, the key size is between 50 kB and several hundred kB, compared with a few thousand bits for RSA. However, this drawback can be avoided by introducing highly structured codes which can be stored more efficiently. Instead of storing the whole matrix, one needs only to store its first row. Examples include quasi-cyclic [9] and quasi-dyadic [10] codes, as well as low-density parity-check codes [11] . But nevertheless, there have been several works showing that these kinds of codes are very sensitive to structural attacks [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
To instantiate McEliece, a vector space dimension n, a code dimension k, and an error-correcting capability t are chosen. The selection of a parameter set (n, k, t) determines the properties of the cryptosystem instance, for example, security level, size of the public and private keys, information rate, computation complexity. Two of these parameters can be chosen independently; usually these are n and t, and k is treated as a function of these parameters.
This paper solves the problem of selecting secure parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. Our security model uses the methodology of Lenstra and Verheul [1] based on Moore's Law. As far as we know, this work is the first document properly focused on this subject. Our main goal for the selection of parameters is to satisfy a minimum security level. Given that the first goal is satisfied, we want to minimize the public-key size. The results of our optimization can be found in Table 3 .
There are, of course, other properties that can be optimized, for example, encryption or decryption speed. The reason why we focus on the key sizes is the following. While the McEliece cryptosystem is very efficient and does not require special hardware, it suffers from the drawback of having large public and private keys. For example, in a smart card implementation we analyzed 1 , the computation time for encryption and decryption accounted for only 5% of the total time, while the data transfer of the public key required 95% of the total time. Therefore, reducing the public and private key size is an important target.
We would like to emphasize that in our analysis, we consider only such factors as computing environment available to an attacker and cryptanalytic advancement. These aspects definitely have long-lasting impact on security of cryptographic primitives (McEliece encryption scheme, in our case). There exist other factors that affect security: implementation of a primitive, deployment in practice as a part of a cryptographic protocol, usability issues, non-cryptographic attacks (e.g., social engineering, phishing attacks) and many others. These aspects either do not have a long-lasting effect which we try to capture, and/or are hard to quantify and include in the analysis. Nevertheless, it is not worthless to try to include some of the above aspects in an analysis of selecting appropriate key sizes. Still in this paper, we limit ourselves only to the two aspects: computing environment and cryptanalytic advancement.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we will review relevant details from coding theory and the McEliece cryptosystem, so as to introduce our notations and review the commonly used relevant terminology. Section 3 describes our security model. Further in Sect. 4, we give details of the methodology of obtaining secure parameters. Using this methodology we devise an algorithm which produces our main result: Table 3 . We conclude in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries

Coding theory
Error-correcting codes are widely used in practice, especially for information transfer over noisy channels. Applications are: CDs/DVDs, DSL, DVB-TV, mobile phones, satellite communication, and many more. In cryptography, errorcorrecting codes also have applications. Many code-based cryptosystems make use of the error-correcting capability of an underlying code by intentionally adding errors to the message, such that these errors may only be efficiently corrected using the private key. The extensive research and many hardware developments due to the increasing popularity of error-correcting codes make code-based cryptosystems a promising candidate for cryptography.
In this section we provide a short introduction to errorcorrecting codes and the McEliece cryptosystem. A more detailed description can be found in [18] .
In general, a linear code, denoted here C, is a k-dimensional subspace of an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q , where k and n are positive integers with k < n and q a prime power. The elements of a C are called codewords. The information rate (or rate) is defined as R = k/n. The weight of a vector x, denoted by wt (x), is the number of its nonzero entries, and the Hamming distance between two vectors is the weight of their difference. The minimum distance d of C is the minimum of all Hamming distances between any two distinct codewords; a code C with these properties is denoted as an [n, k, d] code. A generator matrix G of C is a matrix whose rows form a basis for C, that is, C = {xG : x ∈ F k q }. A parity-check matrix H of C is defined by C = {x ∈ F n q : H x T = 0} and generates its dual space. The error-correcting capability of a linear code is the maximum number t * = (d − 1)/2 of errors that the code is able to decode. Sometimes we want to add fewer errors than theoretically possible. Therefore, we denote by (n, k, t) an [n, k, d] code with t ≤ t * . In this paper, we restrict our attention to the binary case, that is, q = 2. In the rest of this section, we fix n, k, t, and a linear (n, k, t) code C over F 2 .
The security of code-based cryptosystems is based on the difficulty of some classical problems of coding theory. The most relevant in our context is the Syndrome Decoding problem (SD), which decisional problem was originally called Coset Weights and proved NP-complete in [19] for the general class of linear codes. It can be stated as follows.
Syndrome decoding problem (SD):
Let r and n be two positive integers such that r < n. Given a binary matrix H ∈ F r ×n 2 , a vector s ∈ F r 2 and a non-negative integer t, find a vector x ∈ F n 2 of weight wt (x) ≤ t such that H x T = s.
The McEliece cryptosystem
The McEliece public-key encryption scheme was presented by McEliece in 1978 ( [3] ) and is one of the best-studied code-based schemes to date.
The idea behind this scheme is to first select a particular (linear) code for which an efficient decoding algorithm is known and then to create a trapdoor function by disguising the code as a general linear code. Since the problem of decoding a linear code is NP-complete, a description of the original code can serve as the private key, while a description of the transformed code can serve as the public key.
The McEliece encryption scheme using Goppa codes, as originally proposed by McEliece, has resisted cryptanalysis to date. The system was also the first public-key encryption scheme to use randomization in the encryption process. Although computationally very efficient, the McEliece encryption scheme has received little attention in practice because of the very large public keys.
Construction:
We provide an overview on the construction of the McEliece cryptosystem. See [20] for more details. Fix n, k, t as in the previous section. Let C be a binary (n, k, t)-Goppa code defined by a so-called Goppa polynomial g of degree t, together with a fast decoding algorithm that can correct up to t errors. In the case of Goppa codes, we have the relation k = n − t · log 2 (n) . Let G be a k × n generator matrix for C. To create the disguise, choose a random k × k invertible binary matrix S (the scrambler) and let P be a random n × n permutation matrix. The matrix,
is made public, while g, S, and P form the private key (G can be constructed from g and the set of points where g is evaluated).
Encryption:
Represent the plaintext as a vector m of length k, choose a random error vector e of weight t, and compute the ciphertext as c = m G + e.
Decryption:
To recover the plaintext m from c, first compute c = cP −1 = mSG + eP −1 . As P is a permutation matrix, eP −1 has the same weight as e. Therefore, the decoding algorithm for the code generated by G finds and corrects these errors, resulting in mSG, which is then decoded to m = mS. Finally, compute m = mS −1 .
Remark 1
We assume G to be in systematic form, which can be achieved by Gaussian elimination:
where I k is the identity matrix of size k. This allows to store the public key more efficiently and reduces its size to k(n −k) bits. See [20] for more details.
Remark 2 Generating the random error vector e of length n and weight t can be done as follows: First, a random bit sequence s r of length l is generated using a cryptographic pseudo random number generator (CPRNG); from this sequence, e is computed using a constant weight encoding function. From a practical point of view, one can use the constant weight encoding proposed in [21, p. 35] with l ≥ log 2 ( n t ) . From a security point of view, there are different ways to implement such a CPRNG (e.g., AES in counter mode or a hash-based PRNG). In order to prevent the security margin from decreasing, the complexity to attack the sequence produced by the CPRNG has to be greater than that to break the McEliece system with corresponding parameters.
Our security model
Security of the McEliece cryptosystem
Since the introduction of the McEliece cryptosystem, different attacks against it have been proposed in the literature. Some attacks, called structural attacks, aim at recovering the private key from the public key. A detailed overview of these attacks can be found in [22] . Other attacks, called decoding attacks, attempt to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext, and most of them are based on information set decoding (ISD) or, in some cases, on the Birthday algorithm, generalizations and improvements of these two. Other types of attacks have been proposed, like iterative decoding [30] and statistical decoding [31, 32] , but they achieved little success. The ISD attacks seem to have the lowest complexity. For these reasons, we base our security analysis on the complexity of this kind of attack.
The working principle of an ISD attack is as follows. Consider an (n, k, t)-linear code C with a generator matrix G. Denote by c ∈ F n 2 a received word, that is, c = x +e with x = m G ∈ C and e ∈ F n 2 is the added error of weight t, where m ∈ Over the years, several ISD algorithms have been described and improved. The most important of these are listed in Table 1 , together with their respective binary work fac- tor to decode a (1024, 524, 50) Goppa code (these are the original McEliece parameters). Explicit bounds for some of these algorithms can be found in [33] . In 2010, Niebuhr et al. [34, 35] presented improved lower bounds for ISD algorithms, based on the lower bounds in [29] and the idea of [36] . For our computations, we use the results in the (unpublished) latter paper to determine the security level S(n, k, t) of a given (n, k, t) Goppa code since they include the improvements from [36] ; however, the difference to the results in the former paper is marginal.
It is worth noting that a polynomial time distinguisher for binary Goppa codes of high rate has been recently proposed in [37] . This distinguisher is based on the algebraic attack introduced in [14, 15] Table 1 ]). Our parameters, however, do not satisfy these constraints and are therefore secure against the techniques in [37] . In fact, as proved in [37] , the distinguisher does not work for any binary Goppa code with Goppa polynomial of degree t ≥ z min , where z min is defined as the smallest integer z fulfilling the following condition:
where α = log 2 (n) and β = log 2 (z) + 1. In our parameters list (see Sect. 4, Table 3 ), we always have α ∈ {11, 12} and the smallest value of t is equal to t min = 39. However, α ∈ {11, 12} computationally results in z min ∈ {11, 16}, respectively. Since t min > z min , we conclude that our selected binary Goppa codes with parameters (n, k, t) listed in Table 3 cannot be distinguished from a random linear code by the techniques introduced in [37] . In addition to this distinguisher, a further algorithm has been proposed in [38] based on [27] . This algorithm aims at solving only one SD instance out of many. However, the authors in [38] do not provide any asymptotic analysis of the advantage of their algorithm when attacking multiple targets instead of 1. For attacking the (1024, 524, 50) McEliece cryptosystem with a single ciphertext, their algorithm needs at least 2 68.1 binary operations.
The Lenstra-Verheul model
In 1999, Lenstra and Verheul [1] (LV) described a mathematical model providing key length recommendations for public-key cryptosystems based on integer factorization (IF), discrete logarithm (DL), and elliptic curve DL. This is the first important publication that uses a mathematical approach for the determination of secure key sizes based on concrete parameters. After the introduction of this model, several papers made use of it to find the appropriate key lengths for cryptographic primitives (see, for example, [5, 39, 40] ). Furthermore, many companies have used this model to estimate the acceptable key length for their cryptographic applications. For instance, in 2004, McAfee, the computer security company applied the LV-model to find the minimal key size for SSL connections [41] . Another interesting organization is the BlueKrypt company which hosts the website www.keylength.com. This site has an implementation of the LV-model and summarizes reports from well-known organizations allowing the evaluation of the minimum security requirements for some symmetric and asymmetric systems in the future. Below, we present the LV-model in more detail.
The LV-model is based on a set of assumptions that combine the impact of cryptanalytic progress and the effect of changes in computing environment. The key points of this model on which the choice of parameters depends are the following:
1. Security margin: It is the year s which is used to "anchor" the extrapolation. In [1] the default value of s is 1982 which represents the last year for which it is assumed that a 56-bit key DES cryptosystem provided adequate security for commercial use. The computational effort for breaking the 56-bit DES system was estimated to be 5 · 10 5 MIPS-years. In order to estimate the security level provided at a given year, Lenstra and Verheul define a function IMY(y). This abbreviation stands for "Infeasible number of MIPS-years 2 for year y", and it refers to the minimum computational effort that is expected to be infeasible to do in year y. In general, we define IMY(y) in such a way that a successful attack using tens of thousands of year-y CPUs requires more than 100 years to finish. The number of CPUs is a rough estimate for the effort a security agency might put into an attack. The number of years is derived from the fact that US law used to require some national secrets to be protected for 75 years. 3 
Computing environment: This estimates the changes in
computational power available to attackers. This estimation is based on a slight variation of Moore's law by introducing three variables a, b, and c that specify the changes in hardware speed, IT budget, and price over time. The definitions of these variables and their default values are as follows:
-a is the expected average number of months in which processor speed and memory size increase by a factor of two. The default value is a = 18, which is the value specified by Moore's law and is so far in line with current hardware developments. In this paper we are going to use the same value due to the fact that over the last years, hardware development has resulted in a doubling of transistors (for a fixed price) every 12-24 months. 4 Thus, a default of 18 is a compromise of this historic data. Also, opinions differ in whether hardware development will slow down or new technologies will further accelerate it; -c ∈ {0, 1} indicates how to interpret the variable a. For c = 0, the amount of computing power and memory which is available to an attacker doubles every a months, while for c = 1, the computing power and RAM for a given price double every a months. We will use c = 1 since the historic trend mentioned above refers to a fixed price. -b is defined as the average number of months it takes for IT budgets to double. According to historic data, 5 the US Gross National Product has doubled approx. every 10.5 years over the last 30 years. Since the exact growth varies every year, we will use an average value to extrapolate over a larger period of time. Our default setting for b is 120.
3. Cryptanalysis: This refers to the expected cryptanalytic progress. It is measured by the number of months r it is expected for cryptanalytic attacks to become twice as effective. We estimate this number by attacks against code-based cryptosystems only, since the cryptanalytic development can be very different for other cryptosystems. Lenstra and Verheul's default value is r = 18. In code-based cryptography, we find it reasonable to assume that the pace of future cryptanalytic developments and their impact will be relatively close to what we have seen from 1988 to 2009. By applying a linear regression on data points listed in Table 1 , we get a line whose slope roughly equals −0.41, meaning that a twofold attack efficiency improvement will happen in each 1/0.41 ≈ 2.44 years. Also, the value of r is r = 2.44 · 12 ≈ 29.27. In this paper, we take r = 30, which corresponds to 2.5 years.
At the end of this section, we will provide a sensitivity analysis for the variables in our model.
Based on these parameters, Lenstra and Verheul present a formula which can be used to derive lower bounds for the algorithmic complexity that offer a specified security margin at least until year y in the future (independent of the concrete asymmetric cryptosystem). To do this, they show how IMY(y) is derived from the parameters above. Given that breaking the DES system takes 5 · 10 5 MIPS-years, which was infeasible in the year s = 1982, the function IMY(y) is defined by:
(1)
With our default settings, it follows that in year y a computational complexity of
provides an acceptable level of security. The next step is to convert this lower bound expressed in MIPS-years to a lower bound for the number of binary operations. In order to do that, we use as a data point the result [28] 
Similar to [1, p. 9] , S(n, k, t) is defined as the expected runtime of the fastest algorithm known at the time the extrapolation starts-i.e. 2008 in our case-for attacking the McEliece cryptosystem with the parameter set (n, k, t). In our case, this corresponds to the lower bounds presented in [34, 35] . The value 1.7·10 5 is expressed in MIPS-years and obtained from the fact that the attack by Bernstein et al. [28] required 1,400 CPU days on Q6600 quad processors. Assuming that a Q6600 processor [28] does approximately 44, 000 MIPS (SiSoft Sandra benchmark and [42] ), this corresponds to 1.7 · 10 5 MIPS-years.
Therefore, the inequality (3) becomes: 
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we analyze the choice of the values we described in Sect. 3.2. More specifically, we estimate the impact that a different value of each variable has on the resulting security level. This analysis quantifies the robustness of our model, and it allows users to apply our results even if they have different assumptions about the correct values.
1982 and DES-56 bit
The function IMY(y) was "anchored" by defining 1982 as the last year in which breaking the DES scheme with 56-bit key was considered infeasible. The choice to use DES with 56-bit for this definition is arbitrary; the function, therefore, is defined using the number of operations required to break the DES scheme, and it is thus independent of which cryptosystem was used for the definition. Any other year and/or cryptosystem can be used for the definition, for example, AES or RSA. Using the data from the 2008 attack by Bernstein et al. [28] that a 44,000 MIPS CPU breaks the original McEliece parameters in 1400 CPU days, the attack complexity estimated as 2 60 operations corresponds to 2 17.3 MIPS years. An attack complexity of 2 80 operations, which was considered the "smallest general-purpose level" of security 6 in 2008, corresponds to 2 37.3 MIPSyears, very close to our estimate of I MY (2008) = 2 38.8 .
Moore's Law (parameters a and c)
The original Moore's Law refers to the number of transistors on an integrated circuit [43] . Moore estimated this number to double every 2 years. 7 The number of MIPS of a CPU depends on the number of transistors, but also on the clock speed. These two factors taken together increase the chip performance by a factor of two every 18 months [44] (estimated by David House, an Intel executive). For our sensitivity analysis, we will consider a 10% error in this estimate, that is, a range between 16 and 20 months for a twofold performance increase. The value c = 1 is in line with past developments, but we will show the impact of c = 0 below.
Budget (parameter b)
Our choice for the value of b is based on the budget development of the United States, since it constitutes the largest economic power worldwide. However, countries like China have a much higher economic growth; some analysts expect China to overtake the United States in the near future, doubling the US economic power in 2030. 8 This growth corresponds to a twofold increase in economic power in 6 years. Even though GDP of China is smaller than that of the United States (about 40% in 2010) and the faster growth is therefore on a smaller baseline, we will assume a range of 72-120 for the value of b.
Cryptanalytic progress (parameter r )
For more than two decades, cryptanalytic progress has improved the efficiency of the fastest attack algorithm by a factor of two every 30 months. While every individual attack algorithm has a lower bound for its complexity (see, for example, [28, 29, 34] ), many new attacks have been developed which improved the previous bounds. As in the case Impact is the absolute and percent change in the required security level for the year 2050 of Moore's Law, it is unclear whether generic attack algorithms have a lower bound for their complexity that cannot be improved, thereby slowing down cryptanalytic progress, or whether new cryptanalytic tools will increase the progress. We will therefore consider a larger range for r , from 20 to 40 months.
Conclusion
It can be seen from Table 2 that even very pessimistic assumptions (from an user's point of view) do not lead to dramatic changes in the required security level (Table 3) . For example, assuming the most pessimistic value for all four parameters above raises the required security until at least 2050 from 131 to 149 bit, an increase of 18.6 bits or 14.2%. Also for instance, ranging parameter a from 16 to 20 changes the security level between 126.4 and 136.7 bit, an absolute change (Abs.) of 5.7 bit and a relative change of 4.3 %. Table 4 applies the optimistic and pessimistic assumptions described above and shows optimal parameters for selected years.
Parameters selection
Our methodology
The problem of estimating secure parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem for security until at least a given year consists in obtaining, for the security level S calculated in (3), a set of parameters that achieves this security level and provides the smallest key size among all other such sets. To solve this problem, we use the following methodology:
1. Based on simplified theoretical arguments we show that there exists an optimal information rate R * = k/n with R * ≈ 0.8 such that for a given key size the maximum of security is achieved at this rate. 2. We show how an instance attaining maximum security for a given key size can be used to solve the problem of finding the optimal key size for a given security level.
3. We present an algorithm that we use to find optimal instances that have a rate of ≈0.74, corresponding to the arguments from 1.
Already in [45] it was pointed out that the ISD-family of algorithms has an approximate complexity of
where p(n) is some polynomial in n and t (n, R) the errorcorrecting capability. For the classical ISD the degree of p is 3 and it gets lower for improvements. In the case of a t-error-correcting Goppa code of length n and dimension k = n − t log 2 n , the above formula becomes
where c(R) = −(1 − R) log 2 (1 − R) is the complexity coefficient. In [45] it is also mentioned that, neglecting p(n) and concentrating only on the exponential part, the following can be shown: for a given code length n, the highest complexity is achieved at an information rate of 1 − e −1 ≈ 0.63. Although we will compute our table using the lower bounds from [29] , we would first like to provide some theoretical evidence that the optimal rate exists also for the problem of the smallest key size. Considering that the numerous improvements of the ISD enhance only the polynomial part significantly, the reasoning appears to be sound. In the following lemma we simplify C G (n, R) to
similarly to [45] . (7) is achieved at an information rate R * ≈ 0.8.
Lemma 1 Given the key size K , the maximum complexity of an ISD-like algorithm as per
). Now if we substitute, this expression in (7) we obtain
Fixing K and taking a derivative we have the following equation for obtaining the point of maximum: where
Consider now the equation
The solution of this equation is a root of the equation
and numerically this root is R * ≈ 0.8. This shows that the function c K (R) is bounded: 0 < c K (R) < c K (R * ). Now considering that for K , and thus for K s , large enough the second summand of (8) is negligible, we are left with the equation (9) . The root of this equation is R * . Now let us show that having the fact that the maximum complexity for the given key size is attained at some R * , the minimum key size for the given security level is achieved for a code with the same rate R * .
Proposition 1 Let the security level S * be given. Let C(K , R) be the complexity of a decoding algorithm A for a code with the key size K and rate R. We impose the following formal assumptions on C(K , R):
Further, assume that for given K the maximum complexity of A is achieved at R * : Proof Due to (a) the function C * (K ) is continuous and due to (c) is strictly increasing. Now because of (b), there exists a solution to C * (K ) = S * . And because of the above mentioned properties of C * this solution is unique: C * (K * ) = S * . Finally, the claim of the proposition follows from So now we may expect the following to happen in our table. Although we use more advanced lower bounds from [29] , we still expect that for given K the maximum security will be achieved at some R * , the same for all K . As we have mentioned, this is due to the fact that the improvements of the ISD algorithm do not seem to improve much on the exponential part. Moreover, because of the same reason we expect this R * not to differ significantly from the value 0.8 predicted by Lemma 1. Having this, we then use Proposition 1 to construct an algorithm that with arbitrary precision finds an instance with the smallest key possible that achieves the given security level S. This algorithm is depicted below (see Algorithm 1) . In this algorithm, the value of S is calculated via the inequality (4); the interval [R start , R end ] is chosen large enough and contains 0.8: we take an information rate which ranges from R start = 0.6 to R end = 0.85. All other parameters are chosen so that it is feasible to complete the algorithm in a reasonable time. For the key size, we set K up = 200 kB as an upper bound and use the step size K step = 1 kB. Moreover, we use the lower bound formula from [29] as a function C. if C(n, R) ≥ S then return n and R end if R ⇐ R + R step end for K ⇐ K + K step end for return "NO solution found" End
Remark 3 Conditions
Proposed parameters
Our results are presented in Table 3 which shows the following information: -Year: the year until which data security is required. Historic data are given mainly to allow comparison with other sources. -Symmetric key size: the symmetric key size required to ensure data security, calculated in accordance with Lenstra and Verheul's approach. -Lower bound for log 2 (S(n, k, t) ): the log 2 of the minimum number of binary operations (required to break a McEliece cryptosystem) that are expected still to be infeasible in the respective year. -The last two columns are a translation of the required symmetric key size into parameters relevant in practice, that is, the number of MIPS years that render a cryptosystem infeasible to break, and the corresponding number of years on a modern Quad core CPU.
Conclusion
In this work we have addressed the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. This problem was to find instances of the McEliece cryptosystem that are expected to remain secure at least until a given year and providing the smallest key sizes. The computations were modeled using the Lenstra-Verheul framework which is based on Moore's Law and other assumptions about future developments. For this problem, we have presented detailed parameter recommendations. This allows (potential) users of the McEliece cryptosystem to optimize the parameter choice, thereby improving the applicability of code-based cryptography. We have also shown the fact that all such optimal instances have information rate close to 0.74. As a next step, we suggest a comprehensive analysis of concrete application scenarios. As we have illustrated above, these scenarios constraints, as well as the tradeoffs between the code properties, strongly depend on the details of the application, for example, available bandwidth, acceptable response times, or (typical) message size. This analysis would provide further insights into the current strengths and limitations of code-based cryptography, thereby also suggesting new research foci for the future.
